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The Fourth Annual Mid-Atlantic People of Color Legal Scholarship
Conference, which took place at Rutgers Law School in Camden on
February 12-14, 1998, poignantly captured the theme around which the
conference was organized. The theme of the conference was "Law and
Literature: Examining the Limited Legal Imagination in the Traditional
Legal Canon." True to the theme of the conference, many presenters sought
to expand our collective imagination through poetry, fiction, and narrative.
The presentations were intellectually stimulating and provocative. Indeed,
there was a literary quality to some of the presentations. Perhaps most
importantly, the conference itself, in the tradition of the Regional People of
Color conferences, provided us with the necessary sustenance that can only
be found in a community of scholars united by a particular undertaking.
The dual focus of our undertaking is reflected in both the title of the
conference and the papers included in this issue of the Journal. First,
conference participants were concerned about the "limited legal
imagination" reflected in the traditional legal canon. Of particular focus was
the question of which voices, perspectives, and experiences have become
central to the canon, and which are marginalized. Second, participants
focused on "law and literature," invoking literary fiction and poetry to
explore the justice of legal rules and legal decisionmaking. Many scholars at
the conference persuasively made the case that literature, and literary
techniques (like narrative), can broaden the scope of legal discourse by
bringing voices and perspectives which might otherwise go unrecognized,
unheard, or unappreciated.
Angela Kupenda, whose paper is not included here, l provided a useful
framework for thinking about the contributions that literature can make to
legal analysis. Kupenda makes the excellent juxtaposition of law, life, and
literature in her work. She says that of the three, literature is the most honest
and inclusive. Literature can describe reality of the most oppressed lives
with brutal honesty. Laws, on the other hand, tend to ignore the realities and
* Associate Professor of Law, Rutgers School of Law-Camden.
1. See Angela Mae Kupenda, Law, Life and Literature: A Critical Reflection of Life
and Literature To Illuminate How Laws of Domestic Violence, Race and Class Bind Black
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truths for many of us. While life experiences are authentic and equally
moving, we tend not to be as honest in them because we are often afraid to
tell the painful truth of our own lives. Literature thus consists both of "life,"
a person's story, and also of "art," a form of expression. Hence, literature
can help fill the gap left by the incomplete legal narratives that we learn in
law school. In doing so, underrepresented lives can, find their way into legal
decisionmaking
Sherman Clark's contribution nicely situates the discussion in this issue
by providing a thoughtful argument for the utilization of literature to the
lawyerly art of persuasion.2 Persuasion, he argues, depends upon
imagination-in particular, an "imaginative capacity to see the world from
the perspective of others." He calls this imaginative capacity "sympathetic
engagement." Clark attempts to sketch out a functional description of what it
means to persuade others on an issue most closely connected to one's sense
of self and community membership. His attempt focuses on race, but has in
mind other characteristics, like gender and class. He posits that black
lawyers' and academics' failure to persuade others on issues of race may be
attributable to "the tendency to dismiss and caricature rather than engage
with and comprehend those we seek to persuade."
Reading literature, particularly that which brings to the reader different
world views other than their own, may be one of the best ways to develop
the capacity for sympathetic engagement, Clark argues. Certain literary
works may also model for us the very process of persuasion. He illustrates
this quite effectively through a particular passage in Macbeth, pointing to
Lady Macbeth's persuasion of Macbeth not to go through with the murder of
Duncan. Lady Macbeth's persuasive techniques reveal the extent to which
persuasion "is not a process of meeting and defeating arguments." Rather,
Lady Macbeth's argument illustrates that we need to, instead, set forth
arguments, examples, analogies, and other tools of rhetoric that demonstrate
how our desired outcome does in fact have home in that person's world.
This, in turn, depends upon a thoroughly imagined understanding of the
world view in which the argument must resonate, which literature can
provide us.
Michele Cammers Goodwin uses Charlotte Bronte's Jane Eyre to
explore the social, legal, and political climate of the Victorian era and, more
particularly, to place in proper context the treatment of women, people of
2. Sherman J. Clark, Literate Lawyering: An Essay on Imagination and Persuasion,
30 RUTGERS L.J. 575 (1999).
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color, and the mentally ill during this period.3 Bronte's Jane Eyre captures,
according to Goodwin, "the intersection of law, literature and life" in mid-
nineteenth-century England. Goodwin focuses on a character often
overlooked in the novel, and about which very little has been written. The
character, Bertha Mason Rochester, is "the rejected, perhaps insane, black
woman in the attic." The neglect of Bertha's character in the scholarly
literature on Jane Eyre may reflect, says Goodwin, a larger social
disengagement with issues affecting women, particularly those of color,
labeled mentally ill. The attitudes expressed about Bertha's character in the
novel reflect views shared by many during the Victorian Age regarding the
intersection of race, gender, and mental illness. By exploring this
intersection in the novel, Goodwin also challenges feminist interpretations
of the novel, particularly the "over-identification with Jane as victim while
overlooking the black woman in the attic."
Amassing an impressive history of the "symbiosis" between law,
poverty, and madness, Goodwin illustrates how "social status is connected
with perceptions about madness and how poverty and neglect have an
intimate association with mental illness." Both the characters Jane and
Bertha in Jane Eyre represent the disillusioned and disenfranchised,
untouched by the benefits of the legal system. However, in romanticizing a
sweet and courageous Jane and juxtaposing her against the "depraved"
Bertha, feminist scholars have simply created an "other," essentializing the
ideal woman as possessing certain racial and class aspects. Goodwin seeks
to liberate the feminist reading of the novel from its essentialist narrative.
She does this by bringing attention to the character Bertha, in the hope of
stimulating further discourse about the intersection of race, class, and gender
in the treatment of the mentally ill.
George Martinez examines the particular literary technique of narrative
through philosophical lenses.4 Narrative legal scholarship, particularly when
invoked on behalf of underrepresented groups and issues, has recently come
under great scrutiny from various parts of the legal academy. Martinez
attempts to articulate the importance of narrative for "outsider" scholars and
issues by drawing upon the philosophical implications of the debate over
narrative scholarship. He argues that the use of narrative invokes numerous
philosophical issues. First, relying upon Jean-Francoise Lyotard's notion of
the "differend," Martinez attempts to demonstrate how minorities in a legal
3. Michele Cammers Goodwin, The Black Woman in the Attic: Law, Metaphor and
Madness in Jane Eyre, 30 RUTGERS L.J. 597 (1999).
4. George A. Martinez, Philosophical Considerations and the Use of Narrative in
Law, 30 RUTGERS L.J. 683 (1999).
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system might lack a forum and a language to express how they have been
injured. Narratives provide minorities with such a language, allowing them
to communicate their harms to a system which often has not recognized
those injuries. In this way, says Martinez, "narrative is the language of the
other." The use of narrative is also philosophically important for outsiders,
Martinez asserts, for a second reason. Narrative provides a way for
minorities to achieve "authenticity." Relying upon Martin Heidegger's
work on inauthentic human beings, Martinez argues that minorities may be
acting inauthentically when we act upon norms of behavior that are not our
own, even if they are in the mainstream. In legal scholarship, then, narrative
may provide a way for minorities to be authentic in our intellectual life
because it provides a way to move away from standard practices of
scholarship.
Finally, Martinez also responds to various arguments used to undermine
narrative's usefulness in legal scholarship and decisionmaking. He addresses
the argument that narrative represents an "externalist" approach to law and
judicial decisionmaking. This approach is contrasted with the "internalist"
approach, which posits that legal decisionmaking can only be evaluated by
criteria or modalities "internal" to legal doctrine and practices. Narrative
scholarship, the argument goes, is illegitimate because it is outside of, or
external to, the normal modes of legal reasoning. Martinez disputes this
critique of narrative scholarship on two levels. He quarrels both with the
notion that legal decisionmaking is a function solely of internal doctrine or
modes of reasoning, as well as with the perceived uselessness of narrative to
solving legal problems. Martinez also addresses the argument that narrative
is hostile to the Enlightenment ideal of reason. Martinez's response is to
recognize what he claims legal realists long ago recognized: the danger of
giving too much importance to the role of logic or reason in law and not
enough importance to intuition. If intuition rightly has a place in legal
decisionmaking, then narrative is firmly within that tradition.
e. christi cunningham invokes Ron Arias' The Road to Tamazunchale to
illustrate the "death of race as we know it." 5 She asks us to imagine, through
the main character of Fausto, what it would be like to let go of the malignant
aspects of race in our lives and move on to something larger, something that
binds us all together. If race is partially a social construct, a fantasy,
cunningham reasons, then race can be reconstructed, re-fantasized. Like the
character Fausto, who migrates from fantasy to reality in his final dying
5. e. christi cunningham, The "Racing" Cause of Action and the Identity Formerly
Known as Race: The Road to Tamazunchale, 30 RUTGERS L.J. 707 (1999).
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days, people of color also traverse the reality and fantasy of race. This
traversion is, in cunningham's mind, the first step in the process of dying, of
letting go of one reality and moving to another. The dissonance that we have
around race-race as both a social construction or fantasy and race as
domination or reality-illustrates the trauma of race in our lives. This
trauma "is evidenced," she explains, "by self-identification that rages
against racism yet clings to race which makes it possible." Part of the trauma
of race is the commodification of identity, the process of valuing and
devaluing identity, not merely a process of categorizing.
In order to heal from the trauma of race, cunningham argues, we must
isolate and eliminate the parts of race that are malignant and have infected
our identity. Hence, "killing the foreign body and nurturing the remaining
portions of the self is the healing challenge." We should strive to outgrow
the limitations that racial constructs have placed on our identity,
cunningham concludes, and focus on that which truly binds us together.
Narratives, which allow us to construct our own stories, can help us in this
process. We achieve full humanness, not reduced simply by racial
constructions, by interpreting and understanding ourselves and our worlds
and weaving this understanding into our stories. Only then can we build true
and lasting communities.
Leonard Baynes explores aspects of the legal analysis and discourse
surrounding affirmative action through the prism of Rudyard Kipling's
poem The White Man's Burden.6 Much of the legal analysis of the
constitutionality of affirmative action programs involves a weighing and
balancing of the burden on nonminorities by courts reviewing such
programs. Baynes looks at the "White Man's Burden" in the context of the
Federal Communication Commissions (FCC) broadcast telecommunications
policy. Baynes argues that by making the "White Man's Burden" such a
central part of its affirmative action jurisprudence, the Court essentially
undertakes an evaluation of whether white male privilege should be
eliminated. This evaluation is ironic, given the fact that in the poem, The
White Man's Burden, Kipling advised whites that "they had a certain
paternalistic duty-as the superior race-towards those of the inferior
brown and black races." This duty, or sense of, "Noblesse Oblige" (to whom
much is given, much is required) is now passe, as many whites reject the
idea that people of color face the type of socio-economic barriers in need of
special class remedies.
6. Leonard M. Baynes, An Investigation of the Alleged "White Man's Burden" in the
Implementation of an Affirmative Action Program in Telecommunications Ownership, 30
RUTGERS L.J. 731 (1999).
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Indeed, argues Bayne, the concept of "Noblesse Oblige" has been
replaced with the idea of white male victim. In the end, the Court's shift to
a heightened standard of review in the affirmative action context evidences
the desire, Bayne argues, to remove as many burdens as possible to white
male privilege, while giving short shrift to the burdens that minorities face
(particularly in the broadcast industry), and failing, to take into account the
persistent advantage that majority broadcasters have had in gaining access to
government-owned broadcasting spectrums.
The above contributions to this issue of the Journal are thoughtful,
engaging, and timely. Each wonderfully demonstrates the value and legacy
of the Regional People of Color Legal Scholarship conferences, held in six
different parts of the country each year.7 Much like the theme of the 1998
Mid-Atlantic Conference, these gatherings nurture emerging voices and
experiences of groups still underrepresented in the legal academy. Rutgers is
proud to be a part of this continuing effort and accomplishment.
7. The six regions which hold annual conferences are: Midwestern, Mid-Atlantic,
Northeastern, Western, Southeastern, and Southwestern.
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